The controversial double points finale in 2014 and the short-lived elimination qualifying format of 2016 stand as stark reminders of how Formula 1’s intricate governance mechanisms can sometimes lead to deeply flawed and widely unpopular decisions. These significant, yet poorly received, alterations to the sport’s fabric were hastily approved amidst widespread condemnation from fans and stakeholders alike, only to be promptly reversed following immense pressure. Such incidents beg the fundamental question: who truly holds the reins of power when it comes to shaping Formula 1’s regulations? And how has this delicate balance of influence shifted since Liberty Media took ownership of the sport? Veteran F1 journalist @DieterRencken delves into the complexities of F1’s rulemaking process, providing a comprehensive overview of its past, present, and potential future.
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Formula 1’s governance framework is arguably the most convoluted and, some would say, dysfunctional in the entire international sporting arena. Stakeholders within F1 often find it convenient to attribute the sport’s perplexing complexities to the often-incomprehensible decisions made by a sprawling collective of acronyms: Technical Regulation Meetings (TRMs), Sporting Regulation Meetings (SRMs), Working Groups (WGs), Strategy Group (SG), F1 Commission, and the World Motor Sport Council (WMSC). However, this convenient scapegoating often overlooks a critical self-perpetuating cycle: the inherently complex processes themselves are the very source of F1’s enduring intricacies, fostering an environment where clarity is often sacrificed for bureaucratic convolution.
To truly grasp the sheer scale of this regulatory expansion, one only needs to compare the succinct regulations governing the sport in 1963 with the voluminous rulebook of today. Jim Clark’s inaugural championship-winning season, a testament to raw racing talent and engineering prowess, was governed by a mere two pages of regulations. This historical document, a fascinating glimpse into F1’s simpler past, was kindly provided to F1 Fanatic by Cedric Selzer, Clark’s legendary chief mechanic who not only meticulously maintained but also personally constructed the iconic Lotus 25s. Fast forward to the present, and the current Formula 1 regulations span an astonishing nearly 200 pages, a monumental increase that reflects an ever-growing layer of rules and stipulations.
Indeed, a closer examination reveals the immense scope of modern F1’s regulatory landscape. The FIA’s Technical Regulations alone stretch to a formidable 125 pages, while the Sporting Regulations contribute another 70 pages. Adding to this stack, regulations governing staff registrations, a seemingly minor detail, add an additional dozen folios. When factoring in the overarching International Sporting Code, which dictates international competition and administrative procedures across all motorsport disciplines and runs to 78 pages (published in both French and English), the total volume of rules governing Formula 1 surpasses an astounding 250 pages. This immense documentation covers every conceivable aspect of the sport, from car design intricacies to race weekend procedures and personnel management.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the eyes of even the most dedicated fans often glaze over, instinctively reaching for their TV remotes, when discussions turn to the endless stream of rule clarifications, protests, appeals, counter-appeals, and international tribunals. This sense of detachment is particularly pronounced when unfathomable decisions emerge from processes governed by unpronounceable acronyms. Such bewildering complexity often leaves fans feeling alienated from the core decision-making process, questioning the transparency and efficacy of the sport’s leadership. However, a deeper dive into these structures reveals the mechanics behind the perceived madness.
As the charmingly straightforward 1963 regulations unequivocally demonstrate, Formula 1 was not always burdened by such bureaucratic weight. It is equally accurate to state that the current situation spiraled dramatically out of control in the recent past, specifically following the controversial integration of the dysfunctional Strategy Group into the sport’s governance process. The primary architects of this problematic shift were CVC Capital Partners, the former commercial rights holder (CRH). Driven by an insatiable desire for profit, CVC embarked on an ambitious, ultimately failed, attempt to launch an Initial Public Offering (IPO) of F1’s commercial rights on the Singapore Stock Exchange, a move that irrevocably altered the sport’s power dynamics.
To successfully list F1 on the stock exchange, CVC desperately needed long-term commitments from the sport’s most prominent teams. Their “brilliant” solution was to offer preferential terms to Ferrari, Red Bull Racing, McLaren, and Williams, with Mercedes later joining this elite group. The incentives were two-fold: astronomically generous bonuses simply for committing their participation in F1 through to the end of 2020, coupled with highly coveted seats on a newly formed regulation-making body to be known as Formula 1’s “Strategy Group.” This irresistible combination proved effective, securing the commitment of these major teams and solidifying their powerful position within the sport’s governance structure.
The proposed structure of the Strategy Group was designed to concentrate power. It comprised these five privileged teams, plus the highest-placed team outside of this ‘Big Five’ in the preceding year’s championship (initially Lotus, and more recently Force India), each commanding a single vote. Crucially, the Commercial Rights Holder (represented by its subsidiary Formula One Management, FOM) and the sport’s governing body, the FIA, were each granted six votes. This meant that a simple majority vote – requiring 10 out of a total of 18 votes – would be sufficient to push any motion to the next stage of the regulatory process, effectively empowering the ‘Big Five’ and the central authorities.
CVC’s initial vision was for the Strategy Group to entirely supersede the long-standing Formula 1 Commission. The F1 Commission, in contrast to the SG, was a far more inclusive body where all competing teams held a seat, alongside representatives from FOM, the FIA, race promoters, sponsors, and technical partners. By replacing it with the SG, CVC intended to streamline (and arguably, centralise) the decision-making process. Following the SG’s deliberations, the ultimate and final step in the regulatory process would be the FIA World Motor Sport Council (WMSC), which possessed the authority to either reject or ratify decisions but was explicitly prohibited from amending them. This proposed structure threatened to sideline a vast array of crucial stakeholders – numerous teams, race promoters, and valuable sponsors – effectively empowering the ‘Big Five’ teams to unilaterally shape the rules, often at the expense of the underprivileged minority.
It is therefore hardly surprising that independent teams like Force India and Sauber eventually took their grievances to Brussels, where they formally filed anti-trust complaints with the European Union. This landmark case, challenging the legality and fairness of F1’s governance, remains ongoing, highlighting the deep-seated tensions and power imbalances within the sport. Even before the matter reached the EU’s attention, the FIA itself recognised the inherent folly and potential damage of CVC’s original proposal. Consequently, the governing body insisted on retaining the F1 Commission, which had largely operated under Schedule 9 – the established governance process outlined in the 2010-2012 Concorde Agreement.
It is imperative to underscore a critical point: contrary to some past remarks, notably by former Daimler chairman Dieter Zetsche, no comprehensive Concorde Agreement currently exists. What does govern the sport today is a complex web of bilateral agreements. These are individual contracts negotiated between each specific team and the Commercial Rights Holder, outlining their respective obligations – which, tellingly, vary significantly from team to team. Complementing these bilaterals is what is known as the Concorde Implementation Agreement (CIA), a separate accord signed in July 2013 between the FIA and FOM, which essentially provides the operational framework in the absence of a unified Concorde pact.
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All these bilateral agreements, with a single notable exception, are slated to run until the end of the 2020 season. The exception is Renault, whose agreement includes extension clauses. This unique arrangement stems from Renault’s separate re-entry into the sport in 2016 when the company re-purchased the team formerly known as Lotus. This patchwork of agreements, rather than a single unifying document, further complicates the already intricate governance landscape of Formula 1, making any comprehensive reform a monumental challenge. The diverse terms within these bilateral agreements also contribute to varying levels of influence and financial benefits among the teams.
However, simply reverting to the previous governance process proved to be an impossibility. The aforementioned ‘Big Five’ teams had entered into legally binding contracts with CVC, contracts explicitly predicated on the proviso that they would be granted the exclusive privileges associated with the Strategy Group. Faced with this legal conundrum, a compromise was painstakingly hammered out: the Strategy Group would indeed serve as the initial gatekeeping step in the regulatory process, followed by the F1 Commission, and finally, the World Motor Sport Council (WMSC). To placate the powerful ‘Big Five’ teams and secure their continued buy-in, a crucial decision was made: only motions that had successfully navigated and gained approval from the Strategy Group would be permitted to progress to the F1 Commission. This effectively meant that only proposals endorsed by the SG could even be debated by the broader F1 Commission, rendering the latter a rubber-stamping body for the SG’s agenda. It is therefore unsurprising that vital agenda items such as cost-cutting initiatives and resource restriction discussions – measures that would primarily benefit independent teams and promote a more level playing field – invariably stalled and were suppressed at the Strategy Group level, never reaching the wider F1 Commission for consideration.
Consequently, any suggestions implying that all teams are genuinely involved in a truly democratic regulatory process are, at best, disingenuous, and at worst, outright false. In effect, the smaller and independent teams are permitted to vote only on changes that the ‘Big Five’ (or the FIA/FOM) deign to permit them to consider. This unfortunate reality is a direct legacy of CVC’s tenure, a period where the immediate future and fairness of Formula 1 were undeniably sacrificed on the altar of corporate greed. The sport continues to grapple with the profound and lasting consequences of these decisions, impacting its competitive balance and long-term sustainability.
An obvious and frequently raised question is why the FIA, as the sport’s governing body, did not vehemently object to the formation and inherent biases of the Strategy Group. The answer lies in the complex historical and legal separation of powers within Formula 1. Membership in the Strategy Group was explicitly framed as an integral component of a commercial offer extended to the teams by the Commercial Rights Holder. By EU decree, the FIA is legally prohibited from involving itself in F1’s commercial affairs, a strict separation established during the transformative Max Mosley era, when the FIA divested its commercial rights for the sport. This legal firewall, designed to prevent conflicts of interest, ironically constrained the FIA’s ability to intervene in what was presented as a commercial arrangement.
However, this is not to absolve the FIA entirely of responsibility. As part of the proposed restructure, the sport’s governing body did indeed benefit financially, acquiring a one percent share in the holding entity. This share eventually proved to be quite lucrative, valued at approximately £60 million, funds that are now being strategically deployed to finance crucial innovation projects within motorsport. Crucially, though, the FIA did manage to apply the brakes, albeit partially, on the full extent of the structural changes envisioned by CVC, particularly in concert with its then-CEO of F1 affairs, Bernard Charles Ecclestone. The FIA’s intervention prevented an even greater consolidation of power, serving as a vital check, however limited, on CVC’s commercially driven agenda.
So, what became of CVC’s ambitious planned IPO? It was ultimately aborted, primarily in the wake of Bernie Ecclestone’s infamous Munich bribery trial. Although Ecclestone eventually settled the $40 million charges for a sum of $100 million without admitting guilt, CVC publicly attributed the IPO’s failure to the global financial meltdown, despite other major technology companies, such as Facebook, successfully floating on the stock market during the same period. This turn of events created the perfect opportunity for Liberty Media to acquire F1’s unlisted commercial rights in 2017, ushering in a new era for the sport and fundamentally altering its leadership landscape.
This brings us neatly up to date. Exactly a year prior to the original publication of this article, Liberty Media finalized its acquisition, marking a significant turning point for Formula 1. This change of ownership saw Bernie Ecclestone effectively “booted upstairs” into the ceremonial role of chairman emeritus, a position that, in reality, carried virtually no executive duties beyond speaking when directly addressed by the new owners. One of the very first and most symbolic changes implemented by Liberty Media was to grant observer status within the Strategy Group to the disenfranchised independent teams. While a welcome step towards greater transparency, these teams still, critically, do not possess voting rights within this powerful forum.
Reflecting on this limited form of inclusion, one team boss candidly remarked, “We feel like voyeurs.” He elaborated, “We sit and watch the others proceed with their ‘things,’ but we cannot actively participate. Still, it’s undeniably better than nothing, because it means we now have insight into who is proposing which motions, and crucially, who supports them. Plus, it’s certainly a relief that they no longer denigrate us in the meeting…” This sentiment encapsulates the bittersweet reality for smaller teams: a step towards transparency, but still far from genuine participatory power.
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This dynamic was clearly illustrated during recent Strategy Group and F1 Commission sessions. For instance, when the Strategy Group debated the crucial question of minimum driver weight for the 2019 season, the independent teams could indeed observe, learn, and listen to the arguments presented. However, they were unable to cast their votes on this significant topic until it finally reached the F1 Commission a few hours later. The inherent flaw in this structure is glaring: had the Strategy Group decided to reject the motion, it would have been summarily dropped and would never have even appeared on the F1 Commission’s agenda. This process highlights just how effectively the SG can gatekeep important discussions, preventing broader debate on issues that might not align with the interests of the powerful few.
Such a system is, admittedly, farcical, yet it remains the established modus operandi in Formula 1. For irrefutable proof of just how dysfunctional this process can become when allowed to run rampant and unchecked, one need only recall the catastrophic 2016 elimination qualifying debacle. That ill-conceived and swiftly abandoned format serves as a potent reminder of the potential for the current governance structure to generate deeply unpopular and poorly implemented changes if not thoroughly scrutinised and reformed.
To truly comprehend any complex system, no matter how intrinsically flawed it may appear, one must first grasp its entire operational process. In Formula 1, changes to regulations are typically triggered by a multitude of factors. These usually arise from the identification of specific issues that necessitate remedial action, be it for safety, competitive balance, or technological advancement. Such matters are initially discussed and refined within specialized Technical Regulation Meetings (TRMs) or Sporting Regulation Meetings (SRMs), which are habitually convened in advance of the broader Strategy Group and F1 Commission sessions, setting the groundwork for future proposals.
Beyond the team-centric meetings, the FIA also actively draws upon the expertise of various external consultants and advisory groups for new regulatory proposals. These often emerge as a direct response to shifts in broader motor industry trends or technological advancements, ensuring F1 remains at the cutting edge. Furthermore, a significant development under Liberty Media’s ownership has been FOM’s establishment of its own dedicated technical department. This department is spearheaded by the highly respected Managing Director Ross Brawn, a figure synonymous with F1 success, who famously led Ferrari’s technical department during its golden era and later achieved championships with his eponymous Brawn GP team, ultimately laying the strategic foundations for the current Mercedes dominance.
FIA President Jean Todt offered the clearest articulation of the contemporary rules procedure when questioned about potential concerns regarding FOM establishing a “shadow” technical group, given the FIA’s inherent responsibilities as the sport’s legislator. Todt emphatically clarified the distinct roles: “I’m very comfortable with the fact that the FIA is the regulator and legislator of motorsport,” he stated, reinforcing the governing body’s ultimate authority. He praised the new owners, adding, “Liberty Media are doing an excellent job, they are professional people.” Reflecting on past practices, Todt explained, “In the past, what happened, the FIA was working with the teams, using them, working with Ferrari, with McLaren, with Mercedes, with Red Bull, to use them as a kind of laboratory for research, then [these were] implemented.”
He continued, outlining the new collaborative model: “We [now] have a strong team, technical, sporting, inside of Liberty Media. Their responsibility is to give us the outcome of their research and then, as regulator, with the governance, we will deal with that.” Todt concluded with an unequivocal statement emphasizing the FIA’s ultimate legislative power: “But no way will this group make the regulations on behalf of the FIA, that is very clear.” This clearly delineates FOM’s role as a research and proposal body, with the FIA retaining its supreme authority in ratifying and enacting new regulations.
The current composition of the F1 Commission provides for a total of 24 votes, as detailed below. However, given that each official entrant (i.e., each team) is a member by right, this number would naturally fluctuate. For instance, it would rise to 26 if the sport were to accommodate 12 teams, or conversely, drop to 22 if two current outfits were to cease operations. The makeup of the Commission itself is particularly insightful, offering a glimpse into the distribution of power. Teams collectively command 10 direct votes. Furthermore, they can effectively influence an additional two votes through the race promoters they are permitted to appoint (traditionally, the Bahrain Grand Prix aligns with McLaren due to shared ownership, and the Italian Grand Prix at Monza often supports Ferrari), thereby amplifying their collective sway within this critical body.
Members of the 2018 Formula One Commission
| President of the F1 Commission and Representative of the Commercial Rights Holder | Chase Carey |
| President of the FIA | Jean Todt |
| F1 Commission’s delegate (Vice President of the F1 Commission) | Maurizio Arrivabene, Scuderia Ferrari |
| Teams’ representatives | Claire Williams, Williams Martini Racing |
| Toto Wolff, Mercedes AMG Petronas Motorsport | |
| Vijay Mallya (Rep Robert Fernley), Sahara Force India F1 Team | |
| Christian Horner, Aston Martin Red Bull Racing | |
| Cyril Abiteboul, Renault Sport F1 Team | |
| Frédéric Vasseur, Alfa Romeo Sauber F1 Team | |
| Franz Tost, Red Bull Toro Rosso Honda | |
| Zak Brown, McLaren F1 Team | |
| Guenther Steiner, Haas F1 Team | |
| 3 Members appointed by the Commercial Right Holder From Promoters of Events In Europe | Nathalie Maillet (Belgium) |
| Ariane Frank-Meulembelt (Hungary) | |
| Michel Ferry (Monaco) | |
| 3 Members appointed by the Commercial Right Holder From Promoters of Events Outside Europe | Sergey Vorobyev (Russia) |
| Al Tareq Al Ameri (Abu Dhabi) | |
| John Harnden (Australia) | |
| 1 Representative of promoters of Events In Europe – Designated By the Teams | Mr Giuseppe Redaelli (Italian Grand Prix – Monza) |
| 1 Representative of promoters of Events Outside Europe – Designated By the Teams | Sheikh Salman Bin Isa Al-Khalifa (Bahrain Grand Prix) |
| 1 Representative of a supplier of tyres | Mario Isola (Pirelli) |
| 1 Representative of a supplier of engines | Toyoharu Tanabe (Honda) |
| 2 Representatives of F1 Sponsors – Designated By the Teams | Joël Aeschlimann (Rolex) |
| Riccardo Parino (Philip Morris) |
Expanding on this, when factoring in Philip Morris, a long-standing Ferrari sponsor whose influence is significant, and Honda as the engine representative (a position that rotates among engine suppliers unless all are team-owned, as was the case before Honda’s re-entry), the teams theoretically control a formidable 14 votes. Furthermore, Pirelli, the sole tyre supplier, is generally aligned with the teams, who are their primary clients, but also with FOM due to its significant “bridge and board sponsor” status. This alignment potentially pushes the teams’ influence to a staggering 15 out of 17 votes, demonstrating a powerful voting bloc that can significantly shape the direction of the sport’s regulations. The commercial interests and allegiances within the F1 Commission create a complex web of influence, where some voices inevitably carry more weight.
Of the eight race promoter representatives on the Commission, under Liberty Media’s current structure, two are appointed directly by the teams (one for European events, one for non-European events), while the remaining six are appointed by the Commercial Rights Holder (three for European events, three for non-European). This allocation differs from the CVC era, where the CRH appointed four for each category. It is equally intriguing to note FOM’s choice for a sponsor representative: Joël Aeschlimann of Rolex, a former professional ice hockey player, highlighting the diverse backgrounds of individuals involved in F1’s governance. This blend of team, promoter, supplier, and sponsor representation aims for breadth, yet the voting dynamics reveal concentrated power.
Since December of the preceding year, the World Motor Sport Council (WMSC) has also undergone further significant restructuring. Following Jean Todt’s re-election for a third unopposed term as FIA President, his administration has actively reshaped motorsport’s supreme legislative body to enhance its breadth and representation. Notably, retired Formula 1 driver Felipe Massa has been appointed as the karting representative, a position proposed by the Brazilian automobile club, leveraging his vast experience and profile. Furthermore, the President of the Women in Motorsport Commission, a role currently held by the legendary rally driver Michèle Mouton, now automatically holds a seat on the WMSC by right, ensuring greater diversity and a dedicated voice for women within the sport’s highest decision-making echelons.
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Finally, it is crucial to understand the voting parity within the F1 Commission itself: each member holds one vote, irrespective of their status or seniority. This means that a representative from Pirelli, the official tyre supplier, wields as much voting power as a delegate from Rolex, as FIA President Jean Todt, as Scuderia Ferrari, or indeed, as the team that finished last in the constructors’ championship. This democratic voting structure, at least on paper, ensures that a wide array of perspectives are formally acknowledged. Interestingly, Ferrari’s F1 Commission representative holds a dual role, also serving on the WMSC specifically for Formula 1 matters, further cementing their unique influence.
For any changes, be they technical or sporting, to be successfully enacted, a significant majority of 70 percent is required within the F1 Commission (meaning 17 votes from a 24-member council). A crucial deadline is set for April 30th for any rule changes intended for implementation in the following season or beyond. If an agreement is reached after this date, then unanimous consent is required, underscoring the increasing difficulty of making late changes. Subsequently, any motions that successfully clear the F1 Commission proceed to the World Motor Sport Council (WMSC) for final ratification or rejection. This multi-layered approval process is designed to ensure thorough scrutiny, though it often leads to protracted debates and political maneuvering.
Members of the World Motor Sport Council
| President Of The Fia | Jean Todt (FRA) |
| Deputy President Of The Fia (Sport) | Graham Stoker (GBR) |
| Vice-Presidents | José Abed (MEX) |
| Mohammed Ben Sulayem (UAE) | |
| Carlos Gracia Remohi (ARG) | |
| Angelo Sticchi Damiani (ITA) | |
| Surinder Thatthi (CIVG) | |
| Hermann Tomczyk (DEU) | |
| Heping Wan (CHN) | |
| Titular Members | Manuel Avino (ESP) |
| Garry Connelly (AUS) | |
| François Cornelis (BEL) | |
| Dennis Dean (USA) | |
| Nicolas Deschaux (FRA) | |
| Michel Ferry (MCO) | |
| Zrinko Gregurek (HRV) | |
| Victor Kiryanov (RUS) | |
| Hugo Mersan (PRY) | |
| Koichi Murata (JAP) | |
| Juhani Pakari (FIN) | |
| Gautam Singhania (IND) | |
| Vincenzo Spano (VEN) | |
| Serkan Yazici (TUR) | |
| President Of The Women In Motorsport Commission | Michèle Mouton (FRA) |
| FOM | Chase Carey (USA) |
| President Of The Fia Manufacturers’ Commission or the Ferrari SpA Representative | François Fillon (FRA) / Maurizio Arrivabene (ITA) |
| President Of The Drivers’ Commission | Tom Kristensen (DNK) |
| CIK President | Felipe Massa (BRZ) |
However, despite this elaborate and seemingly democratic multi-stage process, the entire regulatory pathway can be irrevocably scuppered by the singular power of Ferrari’s veto, should proposed rule changes or proposals not align with their strategic agenda. The origins of Ferrari’s unique veto power can be traced back to the early 1980s, a pivotal period when Bernie Ecclestone was consolidating control over Formula 1’s commercial rights, initially on behalf of the teams, before ultimately acquiring them in his own name in 1997. Ecclestone, ever the shrewd negotiator, recognized the absolute necessity of having Ferrari’s unwavering support to achieve his commercial ambitions. As a strategic sweetener, he offered the Scuderia this unprecedented veto power, an enduring legacy of that era’s power plays. It was a deal designed to secure stability and cooperation, but one that has since become a contentious point in F1 governance.
The frequency and manner in which Ferrari has historically deployed its veto power, or merely threatened its use, has varied significantly across different leadership eras. While the iconic Enzo Ferrari was content to largely keep the veto as a theoretical leverage, a powerful card held firmly in his pocket, and Luca di Montezemolo occasionally deployed it as a strategic bargaining chip in negotiations, F1 Fanatic understands that the late Sergio Marchionne adopted a far more active stance, frequently brandishing the threat of the veto to influence decisions. This more assertive approach highlighted the ongoing tension between a single team’s historical privilege and the collective interests of the sport, particularly when major regulatory shifts are on the table. The very existence of this veto stands as a significant impediment to truly collaborative and equitable rulemaking.
Considering the persistent issues of complexity, power imbalances, and the potential for gridlock, Formula 1’s governance structure is in urgent need of comprehensive restructuring. Key to this reform must be the outright abolition of Ferrari’s anachronistic veto power, a relic of a bygone era that no longer serves the collective good of the sport. Such fundamental changes are essential to ensure that the regulatory process is once again fit for purpose, promoting fairness, transparency, and agility in decision-making. The target date for the implementation of these sweeping reforms is ideally January 1, 2021, aligning with the end of the current bilateral agreements.
This monumental task represents the single biggest challenge confronting Liberty Media as the new owners of Formula 1. They are widely believed to be exploring a “constitution” process for the post-2020 period, aiming for a more robust and equitable foundational document rather than simply another iteration of the Concorde Agreement. This forward-looking approach suggests a desire to build a more stable and less contentious framework for the sport’s future, addressing the deep-seated issues that have plagued F1’s governance for decades. However, the intricacies and political battles involved in forging such a new constitution are a complex narrative worthy of exploration on another day, as the future of F1’s power structure hangs in the balance.
Follow Dieter on Twitter for more insights: @RacingLines
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